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This study sought to investigate the factors affecting agents‟ liquidity challenges in Nairobi 
County. It adopted a mix method cross-sectional study of agents, master agents, provider 
representatives and bank representatives. The study had three-fold objective: to establish the 
relationship between agent factors and liquidity challenges, to establish the effect of supply side 
factors on agent liquidity challenges and to explore agent perceptions towards liquidity 
management mechanisms. Liquidity challenges were defined as too frequent or few rebalancing 
visits and high numbers of transactions denied due to lack of float. 
The study found that agents experience in the agency was an important determinant of the 
frequency of rebalancing because they have established rebalance routines and relationships with 
rebalancing facilitators thus minimizes liquidity outages. In cases where rebalancing is 
conducted by owners, there are more rebalancing visits due to the instantaneous decision making 
as compared to when employees perform rebalancing due to longer decision making approval 
processes which leads to prolonged liquidity outages. The capital layout of the main business is 
another important determinant of the frequency of rebalancing visits. Higher capital investments 
in their primary business means less liquidity outages as the agency can tap into the working 
capital flows of the primary business to meet its liquidity needs. Banks were the primary mode of 
rebalancing to acquire electronic float. Distance to the nearest bank branch was a very important 
factor in determining liquidity challenges whereby agents located further away from banks 
denied more transactions due to lack float and rebalance less often than agents located closer to 
banks. This was attributed to the travel costs incurred during rebalancing visits and the 
opportunity cost such as loss of potential business of the primary business. 
The study recommended continuous revision of the profile of a suitable agent to include 
experienced, owner-operated and high cash-flows of the primary business. The study also 
recommends an industry rather than provider specific perspective to solving liquidity challenges. 
Managerial level recommendations included decentralization of liquidity hubs beyond bank 
branches, regular agent training and monitoring.  
 
Key words: Liquidity Management, Agent Networks, Agency Banking 
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The following definitions have been adapted from the), and the IFC Digital Finance Handbook 
(2016), GSMA State of the Industry 2016 report (2016) and the MicroSave Agent Network 
Accelerator Kenya report (2014). 
Active agent outlet- An active agent outlet is an agent outlet where any of the tills were used to 
facilitate at least one transaction within the last 30 days (GSMA SOTIR, 2016). 
Agent non-exclusivity- Non-exclusive agents are agents serving multiple financial service 
providers (IFC, 2016). 
Agent outlet- An agent outlet is a location where one or several provider-issued tills are used to 
conduct financial transactions digitally for clients. These transactions include deposits (cash-in) 
and withdrawals (IFC, 2016). 
Agent tills- Agent tills are provider-issued “lines”, which can be SIM cards or PoS (Point of 
Sale) machines, authorized and used to facilitate CICO transactions (GSMA, 2016), (MicroSave, 
2015). 
CICO services- Deposit and withdrawal transactions to either a mobile money account or bank 
account (MicroSave, 2015). 
Main/Master agent- Common term among MNOs in Kenya, refers to the agent holding the 
agency contract and is responsible for recruiting (sub-agents) to conduct cash-in cash-out 
transactions (GSMA, 2016). 
Primary business- The main business conducted by an agent alongside the agency business 
(MicroSave, 2015). 
Rebalance – A transaction conducted by the agent or their representative to trade cash for float 
and vice versa (MicroSave, 2015).  
Super agents- These are designated rebalancing facilities for agents usually banks but can also be 
supermarkets and other cash rich entities depending on service level agreements with the mobile 
money providers (GSMA, 2016), (IFC, 2016). 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
This section provides a contextual understanding of the background of the study and defines the 
importance and scope of the study. It includes sub-sections namely; background of the study, 
statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, significance of the study and 
scope of the study. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Emerging evidence in financial inclusion suggests that access to financial services through 
formal accounts can enable individuals and firms to smoothen consumption, manage risk, and 
invest in education, health and enterprises. With over 2 billion people in the world without 
access to a bank account, there is a call for efficiency in the current interventions to achieve a 
consistent and steady growth in financial access (World Bank, 2017). 
Globally, mobile money has responded to this call accelerating financial inclusion for the poor 
evidenced by 19 countries or markets having more mobile money accounts than bank accounts in 
the last decade. On average an active mobile money user conducts approximately twelve 
transactions per month. These transactions include airtime purchase (4.8), merchant payments 
(2.6), deposits (2.2) and withdrawal (1.7) transactions respectively in order of volume of 
transactions per month. Notably, despite the high uptake of mobile money, activity of these 
accounts is low with about 32% of the mobile money accounts in Sub-Saharan Africa estimated 
to be inactive on a thirty-day basis, according to the GSMA State of the Industry (2016) and 
(2017) reports. There is a call to develop more use cases for mobile money to grow the account 
activity, however, this will be turbo-charged by optimal use of agents as the key facilitators of 
cash-in and cash-out services, customer enrolment and customer service for the mobile money 
service. The same GSMA study (2017) has reported high growth in agents with 37 markets of 
countries globally, registering more agent than bank branches in the last decade. 
In Kenya, the proportion of financially excluded populations has reduced from 41% to 17% in 
the last four years, attributed to the reduction in the proportion of the population using informal 
financial mechanisms. This trend is attributed to formal banking services becoming more 
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accessible through alternative delivery channels such as agent banking and mobile money 
according to the Central Bank of Kenya (2018) report. Mobile money is leading in financial 
inclusion with the M-PESA service holding a majority market share (70%) in terms of registered 
customers according to the Communications Authority of Kenya (2018). In terms of agent 
performance there has not been recent studies providing a comparison of mobile money and bank 
agents except for the MicroSave Agent Network Accelerator study (2014). The study shows that 
M-PESA agents are leading in physical presence at 79% while noting the increase in physical 
presence of bank agents from a negligible share to 15%. The (CBK) Central Bank of Kenya 
(2016) acknowledged the increasing acceptance of agency banking by Kenyans. The CBK report 
noted that local commercial banks are leading in use of banking agents as part of their channel 
diversification strategies to reach new market geographies at a reduced cost and offer more 
convenient access to financial services among other rationales. The number of agents for the 
leading banks in Kenya is shown in the Table 1.1 
Table 1.1 Agent Numbers in Kenya 2016  
Financial Service Provider Number of agents Percentage 
Safaricom „M-PESA‟ 124,084 65 
Equity Bank „Equity Agent‟ 25,428 13 
Airtel „Airtel Money‟ 18,354 10 
Kenya Commercial Bank „KCB Agent‟ 12,883 7 
Co-operative Bank „Kwa Jirani‟ 8,856 5 
Total 189,605 100 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya (2016 Report), Communications Authority of Kenya (2016/7), Author 
computations. 
 The digital financial service providers in Kenya are primarily regulated by separate bodies 
namely; the Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK) for mobile money service providers 
while banks are regulated by CBK. However, the distribution of financial services through 
agents is regulated by The National Payments Act (2013) by CBK which provides guidelines on 
among other issues, the use of the agency model by various providers. In particular it requires 
financial service providers to recruit agents with basic requirements as to have a main business 
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for one year, attained 18 years of age and be able to raise the required initial capital as float 
among others. The regulation requires the financial service provider to train the agent, ensure 
that their shop is branded with the providers and issue contracts outlining the responsibilities of 
the agent including among others adherence to Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) and appropriate escalation of matters. The act also mandated non-exclusivity 
to allow all agents to serve multiple providers without contractual consequences from either 
provider. 
The agent business according to McGranth (2014) is a liquidity management business since it 
involves “loading value into the mobile money or bank agent system, and then converting it back 
out again into cash” which is commonly referred to as liquidity. Agent‟s liquidity management 
takes two forms electronic cash and float according to the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) Liquidity Management Toolkit (2015). Agents‟ balances in the wallet or agency bank 
account for mobile money and bank services respectively, may fluctuate up and down depending 
on the number and value of cash-in (deposit) and cash-out (withdrawal) transactions conducted 
throughout the day. While it is unlikely that the customer deposit and withdrawal transactions 
will balance out at the end of the day, the agent may run of electronic cash or float. If an agent 
does not have a bank account linked to their agent till (wallet or bank account) they will have to 
make a trip to the bank. In Kenya, providers like M-PESA have involved other players in the 
agent management chain such as master agents to help agents acquire electronic float without 
visiting a bank branch.  
The IFC (2015) remarked that unlike electronic float which can be managed remotely, obtaining 
physical cash requires physical interventions. Financial service providers globally such as 
GCASH in The Philippines are linking agents with microfinance banks to have their branch 
managers pick up excess cash from the agents. Others in Pakistan and Bangladesh according to 
MicroSave (2017) hire float runners to deliver physical cash to agents at the door step of their 
premises. Wing in Cambodia according to IFC (2016) finances cash rich entities to facilitate 
agent rebalancing in areas where it is difficult to access a bank or a provider facility. 
The MicroSave ANA (2014) and IFC (2015) concur that despite the considerably mature agent 
networks and banks „enthusiasm to agent banking in Kenya, liquidity management is still a top 
concern for the industry. Issues such as unpredictability of customer demand for agent services, 
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agents‟ lacking adequate capital to invest in the agency business, time taken to travel are among 
reasons cited by agents in the MicroSave (2014) study as the top barriers to liquidity 
management. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
In Kenya, digital finance has turbo-charged financial access according to Financial Inclusion 
Insights (2016), with 67% of Kenyans have access to an agent within a kilometer from their 
home. However, the access to financial services through agents has not been optimal. Often, 
Kenyans have to visit more than one agent further from their home to complete a single 
transaction (FII Kenya 2016). The GSMA (2017) also points to the shrinkage of once robust 
agent networks in Sub-Sahara Africa recording a lower growth in agent activity than the growth 
in overall agent registrations. This situation is even more real in Kenya where a significant 
proportion of agents (11%) in Kenya operate below profitability while at the same time denying 
at least three transactions daily due to liquidity challenges. This according to MicroSave (2014) 
is attributed to agent liquidity challenges which were evidenced in the same study by agents 
saying that liquidity is a top concern for their business.  
 
Furthermore, an earlier study by CGAP (2011) noted that agents spend a significant proportion 
of their income in liquidity management activities. This is telling of looming agent sustainability 
problems if the agent‟s liquidity issue is not adequately addressed. The McKinsey „Digital 
Finance for All‟ 2018 report estimated the transaction costs saving potential of digital finance at 
80-90% of the brick-mortar unit transactional costs. The agents‟ liquidity challenges and the 
resultant shrinkages in the agent network may undermine this cost-saving promise.The liquidity 
management challenge is being addressed in variant ways across the globe. For example, in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, financial service providers use of float runners, and advance float 
mechanisms to supplement bank branches in offering liquidity facilities to agents. However, 
these solutions may or not work in the Kenyan context due to unique factors such as 
infrastructure, regulation, security among others. It was therefore important to investigate ways 
of adapting such solutions to Kenyan context as well as innovative ways to abate the agent 
liquidity challenges in Kenya. 
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Reviewed literature suggests that even developed agent networks like Kenya‟s M-PESA 
continue to face agent liquidity challenges. Agents‟ liquidity challenges have implications on the 
reliability of the service offered to customers and even more on the sustainability of the agency 
business. This study was therefore necessitated to aid financial service providers in overcoming 
agent liquidity challenges for optimal utilization of their digital finance agent channels. 
1.3 Research Objectives  
1.3.1 General research objectives 
The general objective of this study was to investigate the factors contributing to liquidity 
challenges among digital finance agents in Nairobi. The specific objectives were as follows: 
1.3.2 Specific research objectives 
I. To establish the relationship between agent factors and agents‟ liquidity management 
II. To establish the effect of supply side factors on agents‟ liquidity challenges. 
III. To explore agents‟ perceptions towards liquidity management. 
1.4 Research Questions  
The study sought to answer the following questions: 
I. What is the relationship between agent factors and agents‟ liquidity challenges? 
II. How do supply side factors affect agents‟ liquidity challenges? 
III. What perceptions are held by agents towards liquidity management? 
1.5 Significance of the Study  
1.5.1 To the Agency Theory 
This study validated the information asymmetry argument as proposed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) in the agency theory to the extent that agents have more information about the demand for 
cash-in and cash-out services than the providers. This means that the agents can, therefore, 





1.5.2 To Financial Service Providers 
This study has significance to mobile money service providers and banks by unveiling the 
liquidity challenges facing agents. The findings and recommendations of this study will enhance 
the financial service providers‟ support mechanisms to agents to ensure that they maintain 
adequate liquidity for their agency.  
1.5.3 The Financial Inclusion Community 
Donor agencies, central banks and other financial inclusion advocates will benefit from the 
findings of this study in designing interventions to support delivery of financial services to the 
low-income populations where there is limited access to bank branches.  
1.5.4 The Academia Fraternity 
This study provides insight into the agents‟ liquidity challenges thus providing a basis for further 
studies focusing on more specific themes such as women, youth or rural among others. Agents 
also touch on other verticals such as social protection, agriculture, health and e-payments, which 
are also potential research areas that are founded in this study. 
1.6 Scope of the Study  
This study was limited to analyzing the liquidity challenges faced by agents in their agency 
business and not their primary enterprise‟s business. The agents must be active, defined as 
having conducted at least one cash-in or cash-out transaction in the last thirty days. The study 
was limited to cash-in and cash-out services operations of an agency and no other aspects such as 
remittance, bill payments and customer service which are also conducted by agents. The study 




CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a theoretical and empirical review of relevant literature forming the 
context under which this study is premised. It has five sections namely; theoretical review, 
empirical review, a summary of the literature review and research gaps and the conceptual 
framework. 
2.2 Theoretical Review 
The theoretical literature review has considered the agency theory and liquidity preference theory 
as relevant for this study. Although will benefit from some aspects of the liquidity preference 
theory, it was largely anchored on the agency theory which considers the interests of the 
principle and agents who are the DFS provider and retail agents and is applicable to the unit of 
analysis for this study; the agency outlet. 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory describes the relationship between principal and agent in the business Ross 
(1973), Barry (1975) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined 
agency relationship as: 
[An agency relationship is defined as]…a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf. 
This principal-agent relationship also involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent. (p. 308). 
While the initial proposition of the theory focused on conflict of interest and varying risk 
appetite between the principals and agents, the revision of the theory by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) addresses the issue of information asymmetry. The latter, explains circumstances 
whereby an agent has more information about the operations of the business than the principal. 
This theory has relevance to this study whereby, providers are the principals and DFS agents are 
contractually engaged to provide financial services on their behalf. While providers are 
responsible for the actions of their agents to the regulator, agents are held to operational 
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standards described in service level agreements through contracts. Providers lay down 
supervision and monitoring procedures to ensure that they do not suffer losses, material or 
reputational damage due to the actions of their agents. Furthermore, providers provide support to 
the agents‟ business in managing liquidity through: quality of the service or platform, training, 
monitoring and customer engagement. Agents similarly have a hand in influencing the success of 
their agency business (MicroSave, 2017). Information asymmetry as proposed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) occurs in the agency agreement, whereby agents have better visibility of the 
demand for their cash-in cash-out services than providers.  The agents are therefore likely to 
make decisions based on their information and not the providers‟ instructions. The agency theory 
has its limitations, while some unscrupulous agents deviate from compliance to laid provider 
procedures for their own interest, there are others who are trustworthy and work against all odds 
to create win-win situations for them and the principal whether or not their performance is 
monitored and output measured (GSMA, 2016). The study made findings which validate or 
concur with some of the arguments raised by Ross (1973), Barry (1975) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) in the agency theory. 
2.3 Empirical Review 
The review of empirical literature is organized thematically according to the research objectives 
of the study. Three sub-sections emanate from research objectives, namely: relationship between 
agent factors and agents‟ liquidity challenges, supply side factors effect on agents‟ liquidity 
challenges, and agents‟ perceptions towards liquidity management. 
 
2.3.1 Relationship between Agent Factors and Liquidity Challenges 
Although there is limited literature on how individual agents vary in their liquidity management, 
few demand-side studies have made recommendations on agent factors that may determine 
effectiveness in managing liquidity. Mwangi and Mwangi (2014) investigated the factors 
influencing the uptake of agency banking services by customers in commercial banks in Kenya. 
The study which sought to determine how security, liquidity availability, customers and 
awareness influence the uptake of agency banking by customers, applied a descriptive research 
design with a sample of 497 customers of Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) in Nairobi. The 
analysis was done by descriptive and probit regression. The study established that availability of 
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liquidity affected the uptake of agency banking by customers of the commercial bank and that 
majority of the customers had experienced a transaction failure and lack of liquidity at the agent 
banks (KCB mtaani). Similarly, Mosoti and Mwaura (2014) investigated factors influencing 
slow adoption of agent banking services by customers as a financial inclusion tool as compared 
to the use of mobile banking especially by the unbanked. A case study methodology was applied 
whereby, a sample of 100 bank customers residing in Roysambu constituency in Nairobi were 
selected. The study found that despite high levels of awareness and uptake of agency banking, 
customers, and liquidity outages among agents was the most pressing issue while other issues 
such as high transaction costs, frequent system failures were slowing down active usage of 
agency banking. 
The “Spotlight on rural supply study by GSMA (2015) noted that despite mobile money services 
going deeper into the rural areas the rural customers still remained underserved. The study which 
was conducted in rural markets of Mali and Chad, found that agents who had greater financial 
wherewithal did not have liquidity challenges and were                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
more successful than their cash-constrained counterparts. The study also underscored the need 
for special liquidity facilities to meet the needs of agents in the rural areas. Another study by the 
Consultative Group for the Poor (CGAP) (2011) noted that some agents were selected to become 
agents without rigorous analysis of whether they have the right conditions in place to operate 
profitably-asking the question, how much capital can you raise? and whether you anticipate all 
transactions to be cash-out transactions, and how much it would cost to travel to exchange e-float 
for cash? The study recommended rigorous analysis of how these critical questions help 
providers select and maintain the right profile of agents (CGAP, 2011). This study made 
significant findings which may answer these questions. 
 
2.3.2 Supply Factors Effect on Agents’ Liquidity Challenges 
There are limited studies on the supply-side factors contributing to agents‟ liquidity challenges. 
Ignacio Mas (2010) in the study „Mobile Payments Go Viral‟ in Kenya, found that even the 
leading M-PESA service, had some of their agents experiencing liquidity challenges and were 
unable to meet requests for withdrawals, especially for large value transactions. The study notes 
that there are challenges such as the agent commission structure which discourages outlet from 
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handling large transactions. The study also notes that as a consequence of liquidity fears and 
challenges, agents require customers to split transactions over few days rather than withdrawing 
a lump sum, adding both cost and inconvenience on the customers. The study recommended 
streamlining of the agent management hierarchy whereby the main agents have liquidity 
management responsibilities over sub-agents (Mas, 2010). 
A census quantitative study by Gichana (2013) in the West Pokot region in Kenya on challenges 
facing agency banking interviewing all the forty Equity Bank agents located in the region noted 
that liquidity challenges were highly prevalent with 50% of the agents saying that it was a 
concern for their business. It was found that the agents deny up to 5 transactions per week, which 
leaves customers dissatisfied. The study also found that there are infrastructural challenges 
whereby agents travel long distances to obtain rebalancing services. It is reported that nearby 
small and medium enterprises rely on agents to tidy up cash balances at the end of the day, 
thereby increasing the agents‟ demand for somewhat bigger value deposit and withdrawal 
transactions. This aggravates the liquidity management challenges among agents in the area who 
have to travel some distance to access a bank branch. The study recommended enhanced support 
of agents in remote areas by providers to ensure that they reap the full benefit of the agency 
banking transformation. The Consultative Group Action for the Poor (CGAP) conducted a study 
on best practices of agent network management. The study found that agents‟ security concerns 
are a factor that limits agents‟ liquidity management efforts noting that „agents worry about 
robbery all the time‟.  Agents are liable for some or all of funds lost via theft.  The study also 
singles out the differences in agency arrangements in Kenya versus other countries as implicative 
on the agent liquidity challenges. For example, M-PESA agents in Kenya invest their own cash 
in the till and bear the entire cost of a robbery incidence. In the contrary agents in Brazil are not 
required to invest their own cash, but banks ask them to share some of the cost of insurance for 
the cash and to share some of the risks by being responsible for the first portion of any stolen 
funds. The study further noted that agents in both arrangements are skeptical of holding large 
values of float due to security reasons and eventually incurring a large proportion of their income 






2.3.3 Agents Perception of Liquidity Management 
Few studies have focused on the suitability of the liquidity management support for agents and 
what other alternatives mechanisms agents use in their agency outlets. Gichana (2013) noted the 
liquidity mechanisms used by agents reporting that agents rely on banks to rebalance and 
identified the need for commercial banks to provide alternative rebalancing mechanisms to 
support agents in the rural areas preferably via automatic float top-up. Mwangi (2012) earlier 
discussed study recommended that banks should consider to restructure and re-evaluate the 
criteria for selecting and locating their retail agents to overcome the liquidity management 
problem.  
Another study by CGAP notes that agents incur a large proportion of their income on liquidity 
management. Thus, it recommends that providers learn from leading markets on tactics for 
averting the liquidity management challenges. The study discussed a case study of WING 
Cambodia and FINO who pay “master merchants” a small fee for them to hold a constant 
amount of US$2,000 in e-float and make it available on demand to a group of “subagents” (who 
were required to keep only US$200 in float). Under this arrangement, liquidity balances held by 
agents doubled (CGAP, 2015). 
MicroSave (2015) in the Agent Network Accelerator Project in Uganda commissioned a study to 
understand determinants of successful agents adopting a quantitative cross-sectional survey 
methodology and interviewing 2,000 mobile money agents to understand their operations. The 
study reported liquidity management as an important aspect of agent operations, whereby, most 
Ugandan mobile money agents prioritized liquidity management as a top concern in growing 
their agent business. The study also found that agents are also increasingly rebalancing from peer 
agents (MicroSave, 2015). 
Ignacio Mas in the study „Mobile Payments Go Viral‟ in Kenya, recommended streamlining of 
the agent management hierarchy whereby the main agents have liquidity management 
responsibilities over sub agents providing three main options. First, the main agent provides 
direct cash support to stores -where an agent has float delivered by a store clerk or the agent 
sends cash runners to deliver the float although this is not common. Secondly, the main agent 
uses their respective bank accounts -in which case, if a sub agent has excess cash and wants to 
buy e-float, the agent will deposit the cash into the account of the main agent at the nearest bank 
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branch or ATM. Once the main agent confirms receipt of the funds into its account, the main 
agent transfers M-PESA e-float to the sub agent‟s M-PESA account. Thirdly, the main agent 
deposits (or transfers) money into their account at the branch then withdraws the cash at the 
nearest branch or ATM. However, this mechanism can only be used during banking business 
hours. This presents a problem for stores in the evenings and on weekends (Mas, 2010). 
Other studies such as Iqbal (2012) investigated at the institutional level how banks perceive and 
manage liquidity risk. In a comparative study investigating liquidity risk management between 
23 conventional and 5 Islamic banks of Pakistan using secondary data for the period 2007-2012. 
Liquidity risk, measured in the study by most liquid assets of the banks, was defined as the 
problem arising when depositors want to redeem deposits at a time when the commercial bank 
lacks enough cash in hand. The study investigated the size of the bank, Non-performing loan 
ratio (NPL), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE), capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
and determined that significant and positive relation of CAR, ROA, ROE and size of the bank 
with the liquidity risk. Using ratio analysis of the averages of the variables, descriptive and 
regression analysis, the study found that, Islamic banks had more liquid assets to pay off its 
obligations than conventional banks. Larger banks had higher liquidity risk. The study 
recommended that commercial banks should have a stand-by account and increase of their liquid 
assets. It was also recommended that banks should estimate more accurately their short-term 
demand for liquidity, create a contingency funding plan and combine cash flow. This study is 
limited to a great extent on liquidity management but missing the agency aspect in their scope 
hence findings of Iqbal (2012) can only inform the proposed study with regard to liquidity 
management of retail banking service providers rather than agents. 
2.4 Summary of Literature Review 
Although the empirical studies reviewed in this study demonstrated the challenges facing agents 
in Kenya and developing countries, limited research exists on how agents cope with liquidity 
management challenges facing them. Authors such as Gichana (2013) identified existence of 
liquidity management challenges among agents, and informed the focus and knowledge gaps 





Table 2.1 Summary of Literature Review  




2014  Factors influencing uptake 
of agency banking 
services by customers in 
Kenyan commercial banks 
 Descriptive research, 
stratified sampling  
 Sample of 497 KCB Bank 
customers 
 Liquidity availability was a top driver 
of uptake.  
 Recommended that banks should 
consider to restructure and re-evaluate 
the criteria for selecting and locating 
their retail agents to overcome the 
liquidity management problem 
 Does not discuss the 
characteristics that 
make a right profile of 
agents 
 Does not cover agents 




2015  Agent Network 
Accelerator study in 
Uganda 
 Quantitative cross-
sectional survey of 2,000 
mobile money agents 
 Liquidity management was a top 
concern for agents  
 Unpredictable customer demand and 
travel costs associated with 
rebalancing among key barriers to 
liquidity management 
 Agents innovated work arounds such 
as rebalancing from their peers.  
 Recommends that providers provide 
diversified rebalancing options for 
agents 
 This study will 
validate the peer to 
peer rebalancing in 
Kenyan context 
Gichana 2013  West Pokot region in 
Kenya  
 A quantitative study on 
challenges facing agents - 
Equity Bank agents. 
 Sample- 40 agents 
   
 50% prevalence of liquidity 
challenges  
 Infrastructure challenges  
 Rural areas may experience demand 
for large value transactions due to 
unique clientele such as SMEs 
wanting to tidy up cash balances at the 
end of the day.  
 Unique liquidity management 
solutions. 
 Focuses on agents of 
one bank 
 Misses out on 
qualitative agent 
attributes 
   
CGAP 2011  Best practices of agent 
network management- 
Evaluation of M-Pesa 
agents in Kenya 
 Whose money is invested in the till 
(agent‟s or bank‟s) determines the 
value of float held by agents 
 Agents incur a large proportion of 
their income on liquidity management 
 Security concerns keep agents from 
holding adequate values of float 
 Agents are selected without rigorous 
analysis of their right profile 
 These two studies 
recommend further 
research on capital 
raised by agents and 
costs involved in 
rebalancing e-float for 
cash and their bearing 
on liquidity 
challenges. These 
factors are addressed 
in this study. 
GSMA 2015  „Spotlight on rural supply‟ 
in Mali and Chad  
 Qualitative research 
 How rural agents choose to rebalance 
and access to substantial capital is 
potentially a factor in overcoming 




2.5 Research Gaps 
Some studies such as by Iqbal (2012) have very sound findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations about general liquidity management, however, these studies are generic and do 
not apply to digital finance agents. The CGAP study has noted that providers are in a dilemma as 
to what is the profile of agents that would invest adequate float, how much to rely on banks for 
liquidity services as well as quantifying the risk of float delivery to agents in far to reach areas. 
These questions have not been addressed in the past research agents and liquidity management 
studies.  Further research is required to answer these questions and help providers identify ways 
of supporting agents in liquidity management activities. Furthermore, the Digital Financial 
Services (DFS) industry in Kenya has evolved greatly since 2013 when the comprehensive agent 
study by MicroSave (2014) study was conducted. The regulatory framework on digital finance 
has evolved (Central Bank Kenya, 2013) with new guidelines requiring providers to issue non-
exclusive contracts to their agents making them (agents) available to other providers. It was 
therefore important to –through this study- investigate if the agents‟ liquidity management 
mechanisms had evolved as a result of this and other market trends.  
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
The factors affecting agents‟ liquidity challenges were categorized into three factors namely 
agent factors, supply side factors and agents‟ perceptions towards liquidity management. Figure 





 Number of years of experience 
 Owner or employee of the agency 
 Capital layout of the agency/primary 
business  
 Education level 
Supply-side factors 
Rebalancing facility 
 Distance to nearest bank branch/hub 
 Rebalancing transaction costs 
Provider support 
 Training on liquidity management 





Agent Liquidity Challenges 
 Rebalancing visits frequency 
 Transactions denied due to 
lack of float 
Agent perceptions towards liquidity 
management  
 Rebalancing process 
 Access to rebalancing facilities 
 Liquidity management skills 
 
Independent variables 




Operationalization of the Variables 
The variables of interest to this study were categorized into dependent variable and independent 
variables. 
Dependent variable 
Agent liquidity challenges are the dependent variables under investigation. It was be measured 
by the number of times an agent visits a rebalancing point as found in the CGAP (2011) study 
that agents often close their shops to visits a rebalance point usually a bank branch. The number 
of transactions denied per day will be another measure of agents' liquidity management practices 
as noted in the MicroSave (2014) agent study. 
Independent variables 
Three categories of independent variables have been identified as; agent factors and supply-side 
factors and agent perceptions towards liquidity management mechanisms. Agent factors include 
number of years of experience in the agency, owner involvement in liquidity management, 
capital layout of the primary business. Supply-side factors was measured by accessibility of bank 
branches (estimated distance from the bank to agents‟ location, proxy by the walk time from an 
agents‟ premise to a near bank branch), cost of rebalancing facilities available to agents 
(including travel and rebalance transaction costs), agent training on liquidity management, and 
the frequency of providers‟ (FSPs) monitoring visits to agents premises. Agent perceptions 
towards liquidity management mechanisms were measured thorough; agents experiences with 
the liquidity management process, access to rebalancing facilities and agents‟ perspective of their 
liquidity management needs. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology from research design to the target population, 
data collection methods, data analysis, research validity and quality and ethical issues in 
research.  
3.2 The Research Design  
The study adopted a cross-sectional survey design employing a mix of qualitative research and 
quantitative methods. Qualitative interviews were conducted to understand agents‟ perceptions 
towards liquidity management and the provider support mechanisms for liquidity management. 
These interviews were conducted with a range of respondents, namely; agents, master agents, 
agent managers, providers‟ field staff and super agents. The findings of the qualitative research 
were utilized to refine the agent quantitative questionnaire and to validate the quantitative survey 
findings. 
A quantitative survey was conducted with agents to gather data on agent factors, liquidity supply 
factors and the agent liquidity management practices. The data collected included the agent 
profile; age, education level, owner involvement in liquidity management, capital layout of the 
primary business, agents‟ perceptions towards liquidity management. On the liquidity supply 
factors, agent data such as distance to rebalancing facilities and cost of rebalancing trip including 
travel and transaction cost was gathered. Provider support factors were also captured through 
data on liquidity mechanisms availed to agents, training by providers and the availability of 
regular liquidity support by providers. The survey also sought to validate agent perceptual factors 
gathered in the qualitative study. Agent liquidity factors measured were; number of weekly trips 
made to rebalancing facilities and the number of daily transactions denied due to lack of 
liquidity. 
3.3 Population and Sampling 
The Finscope study (2014) recorded a total of 100,000 agent tills in Kenya. However, since the 
2013 non-exclusivity mandate on agents by the Central Bank of Kenya, one agent outlet in 
Kenya is shared by an average of 2-3 agent tills as noted by Mike & Bersudskaya (2017) 
estimating the number of agent outlets at 67,506 nationally. Majority of agents in Kenya are 
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located in urban areas with Nairobi metropolitan area accounting for 43% of the national agent 
footprint. Nairobi has the highest balance of mobile money and banking agents 76% and 24% 
respectively compared to other urban areas and rural areas of Kenya, according to the MicroSave 
national agent survey (2014). The study targeted eight low income- middle class settlements of 
Nairobi such as Kawangware, Ngara-CBD, Kasarani, Githurai, Kangemi, Umoja, South B, and 
Gikomba. These are the areas are likely to have many agents due to the high rates of financial 
exclusion compared to other upper- class suburbs of Nairobi. 
This study targeted agents conducting cash-in and cash-out services the Nairobi County. Other 
players in the agent network management chain were also interviewed through qualitative 
research techniques. Specifically, the study involved agents, master agents, super agents 
(including bank branches and supermarkets) and field staff of the leading digital financial 
services providers of Equity Bank, KCB bank, Co-operative bank, Safaricom, Family bank and 
Airtel according to MicroSave (2014) agent study in Kenya. A sample of 20 respondents was 
drawn from a diverse set of respondent profiles namely; agents, master agents, super agents and 
financial service provider representatives as shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1:  Qualitative research sample 
 
Non-probability sampling techniques such as snow-balling were used to identify the various 
respondent profiles comprising of master agents, agents, provider representatives and 
rebalancing facility representatives.  
For the quantitative survey, a research sample size of 194 agents was computed as follows 
(Fisher et al., 1995).  
Target respondent Number of interviews 
Agents 10 
Provider representatives 4 
Master agents 3 
















Whereby: N= Population 43% of 67,000 (29,000), z = Standard score at 95 percent confidence level (1.96), p = the proportion of 
occurrence of the variable of focus (which is 0.5), e= Margin of error or level of significance (which is 7%). 
The significance level was marked at 7% since the study seeks to gather agents‟ financial data 
which may be considered confidential. The researcher obtained authorization from the providers 
and worked closely with the field supervisors to enhance the credibility of the study and attract a 
100% response rates from agents. This is however within the 5%-10% range recommended by 
Fisher et al as applicable for social and economic studies (Fisher RA., 1950). Stratified random 
sampling technique was used to select the agents in the quantitative survey as Robson (2004) 
recommends ensuring that all regions are represented.  
3.4 Data Collection Methods 
Qualitative research, in-depth interview guides were designed for each profile of respondents -
agents and providers as advocated by (Kennedy, 2006).In-depth interviews were recorded 
through note taking by trained research assistants. Quantitative data was gathered through 
researcher administered structured questionnaire. The quantitative questionnaires were 
programmed on dooblo-data-collection-software to ensure quality control through timely 
transmission of data after each interview. Consistency system checks were put in place to ensure 
that only valid responses were input thus eliminating coding errors during data entry. Research 
assistants were hired from colleges and universities and facilitated to travel to allocated areas. 
The researcher trained the research assistants in a central location and supported them remotely 
throughout the data collection exercise. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
The qualitative and quantitative data gathered was analyzed through complementing techniques. 
Qualitative data was analyzed on a rolling basis through a thematic analysis approach. Emerging 
cues from the initial interviews were validated in subsequent interviews. The findings of 
qualitative interviews (Appendix Table 7.1a, 7.1b and 7.1c) were utilized in refining the 
quantitative survey and substantiating the findings of the quantitative research where applicable. 
1+ 





Quantitative data on the other hand was collected on an android-tablet survey application and  
analysed using STATA and SPSS software. Table 3.2 details the mix-method analytical 
approaches employed to answer to the objectives of the study. 
Table 3.2 Research Analytical Framework 
Research 
Objective 










 Years of agent experience vs.  rebalance visits 
 Years of agent experience vs. transaction denials 
 Education level vs. rebalance visits 
 Education level vs. transaction denials 
 Capital layout of the primary business vs. rebalance 
visits 
 Capital layout of the primary business vs. transaction 
denials 
 Owner involvement in operations vs. rebalance visits 













 Distance to nearest bank branch vs.  rebalance visits  
 Distance to nearest bank branch vs.  transaction denial  
 Cost of rebalancing transactions vs.   rebalance visits 












 Training on liquidity management vs. rebalance visits 
 Training on liquidity management vs.  transaction denial 
 Agent monitoring visits vs.  rebalance visits 
















 Agents experiences with the liquidity management 
mechanisms 










3.6 Research Quality and Validity 
To ensure validity of the research, all data collection instruments were pilot testing were pilot 
tested and refined before actual data collection. The pilot test data for the quantitative survey was 
statistically tested for reliability before the actual data collection using the Crobanch Alpha split-
half technique. This procedure involves splitting the questionnaire into two halves and 
comparing respondent feedback patterns for the two halves. Then calculating a correlation 
coefficient based on the two data sets. The research instrument for this study attained a 
correlation coefficient of 0.763 (see Table 3.3) which was considered adequate as it surpasses the 
0.7 threshold as proposed by Cronbach (1951). 









N of Items 45
b
 
Total N of Items 90 
Correlation Between Forms .001 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient 
Equal Length .001 
Unequal Length .001 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient .001 
 
To ensure objectivity of the researchers, research assistant training was conducted to ensure 
consistent application of the data collection procedures in the selection of respondents and 
administration of the survey. 
3.7 Ethical Issues in Research 
Finance is the bed-rock of this study since digital finance agents are an extended channel of 
delivering financial services from the conventional banks. Therefore, information sharing was 
treated with as much caution as a typical bank. It was therefore necessary to obtain authorization 
from the financial service providers to interview their agents. Formal introduction letters were 
sent to representatives of agent operations in leading financial service providers to seek support 
during the data collection exercise. The other issue was voluntary participation of the agents 
whereby agents were encouraged to answer only questions that they were comfortable with at the 
introduction of each interview. Some agents were not comfortable providing financial 
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information of the agency despite proof of authorization by the providers leading to incomplete 
interviews. Their findings were therefore excluded in the analysis of this study. Finally, this 
study experienced agents who were very busy to respond to a thirty-minute survey and even 
more for lengthy in-depth discussions. As a principle code applied by all research assistants, at 




CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the study organized by research objective. The first segment 
contains findings of the respondent demographics and attributes of agents followed by 
descriptive analysis of the study, bivariate analysis and inferential analysis of variables of 
interest as depicted in the research analysis framework in the previous chapter Table 3.3. 
4.2 Response Rates 
The study realized a response rate to the quantitative research was 81% whereby 37 out of the 
196 surveys conducted were ruled as incomplete interviews due to dormancy and agents who 
were engaged with their business enough not to complete the survey. Table 4.1 shows the 
achieved sample. 
Table 4.1: Sample for Quantitative Research 
 
4.2 Respondent Demographic Information  
Table 4.2 is a display of demographical agents‟ information from the quantitative research. 
Table 4.2: Respondent demographic information  
Attribute Category Frequency Percent 
Gender Male 111 69.8% 
Female 48 30.2% 
Age group 18-25 6 3.8% 
26-33 63 39.6% 
34-41 67 42.1% 
42-49 20 12.6% 






Number of respondents 194 159 81% 
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 50-57 3 1.9% 
Service provider for 
which agent was 
interviewed 
Safaricom 77 50% 
Airtel 9 6% 
Equity bank 31 19.5% 
Family bank 8 5.5% 
Co-op bank 15 9.5% 
KCB bank 16 10.5% 
Education level of 
respondent 
University degree 30 17.9% 
College diploma/tertiary college 72 62.3% 
Secondary school certificate 31 18.9% 
Years of experience Less than 6 months 7 4.4% 
6 months -1 year 24 15.1% 
13 months -2 years 70 44.0% 
2-3 years 34 21.4% 
3-4 years 17 10.7% 
4-5 years 3 1.9% 
More than 6 years 2 1.3% 
Operator of the agency 
Owner 103 65.6% 
Employee 54 34.4% 
Rebalancing frequency 
Every day 99 62.7% 
Thrice a week 32 20.3% 
Twice a week 15 9.5% 
Once a week 7 4.4% 
Twice a month 4 2.5% 
Once a month 1 0.6% 
  Mean 
Access to nearest 
primary rebalance  
Estimated distance to nearest bank branch (in 
walking minutes) 
39 
Daily transactions Transactions conducted per day  54 




Seventy percent of agents interviewed were male while only 30% of respondents were women. 
This finding points to the reality that most micro and small enterprises are owned by male. 
Interpreting this finding alongside feedback on ownership of agencies in Table 4.2 above 
whereby 66% of respondents indicated they were the owners, it is apparent that most agencies 
are owned by men. Most agents interviewed were middle aged with majority being between the 
ages of 26-41 years old. Agents who were employees were comparatively younger than owner 
agents interviewed in this study. However, agents were only interviewed for one particular 
provider as shown in Table 4.2. Agents interviewed had attained at least secondary education 
level. It emerged that employee agents were more educated than owner agents as shown in Table 
4.3. 
The respondents of this study had served as agent for an average of 1-2 years as shown in Table 
4.2. However, employee agents were less experienced having served for 6-12 months on 
average, a finding which is attributable to possible employee/staff turnover rates in the agencies. 
The level of involvement in the agency was owner dominated (66%) while employees accounted 
for only 34% of the agency operators. However the involvement of employees reduced when it 
came to performing liquidity management activities due to increasing owner involvement up to 
73% while employees and other rebalancing assistants involvement was at 27%.  
 
Table 4.3 Education Level by Ownership 
 
  
A5. What is the highest level of education you have 
attained? (Education level) 



















  11.6% 16.8% 3.2% 4.2% 35.8% 






Respondents interviewed in this study operated other businesses primary to the agency business. 
These businesses ranged from local dukas, hardwares, grocery stores, salons/ barber shops, cyber 
and bureau services, and pharmacy stores among others. Retail stores and petrol stations were 
among agencies whose primary businesses had high capital outlay. Approximately 49% of the 
respondents operated a primary business with investments of between 100,000-500,000 KES. 




Figure 4.1: Capital layout of primary business 
Respondents interviewed were located on average 39 minutes from the nearest bank branch and 
performed on average 54 transactions in total per day as shown in Table 4.3. However it was 
intriguing that they still denied up to 10 transactions per day due to lack of float which 
compounds to approximately 15% loss of business per day. While majority (83%) of agents 
rebalanced three times or more per week, this can be argued as ineffective liquidity management 
especially when travel related mechanisms are the most common forms of rebalancing as 
confirmed in this study and in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Rebalancing options 
Rebalancing option Percent 
Bank 80.0 
Another agent 12.6 
Provider office/branch 5.3 




Of the agents interviewed 80% accessed liquidity from a bank while the rest use other 
mechanisms; another agent (13%), providers‟ office (5%) and delivered by provider staff (2%) 
respective as depicted in Table 4.2. Further to this finding, qualitative interviews with agents 
reported that they relied on bank branches to access float. Half of the respondents reported that 
they rebalance equally for electronic float and physical cash, 35% of reported rebalancing mostly 
for electronic float and 15% rebalanced for physical cash only. However, it is plausible to 
attribute the higher prevalence of e-float than cash due to easy access of electronic float from 
diverse sources such as mobile banking, ATMs and peer rebalancing reported by agents also 
shown in Table 4.2. However, it also emerged through this study that master agents facilitated 
access to float by agents through advance electronic loading of float to agent accounts 
Furthermore, financial service providers reported that they had introduced new ways of 
accessing float such as partnerships with cash-rich entities such as supermarkets; however, most 
agents were not aware of such facilities and still considered banks as the primary rebalance point. 
 
4.3.3 Agent perceptions towards liquidity management 
This study established that more than half of the agents (54%) are confident about their 
capability to perform rebalancing services, while 33% said they depend on support from others 
and 11% saying they require further liquidity management training to utilize new rebalancing 
options. In-depth interviews with agents under further reported that agents‟ fears of theft and 
fraud were informed by the high prevalence among their peers but not necessarily out of their 
own experience. As a result, agents schedule their rebalance visits at times when they perceive 
are more secure, in particular, early mornings. It is no wonder that agents cited banking hours as 
more concerning and not closer proximity to the bank branches. This study also established a 
result of the heightened fear of fraud agents preferred operating with lower amount held as float 
at any one time and similarly lower amounts carried during a rebalance trip. Interestingly, agents 
were not bothered by the cost of travel to nearby bank branches for rebalancing but rather by the 
lengthy process of acquiring the float once at the banking hall and the banking hours. 
Behaviorally, agents postponed rebalancing activities as it requires closing the shop which might 




Figure 4.2: Agents’ Perception of their Liquidity Management Capability  
Other concerns raised were availability of adequate float investments (raised by 6% of the 
agents) and long queues at the banking hall (5%) as shown in Figure 4.3. In terms of mechanisms 
adopted to „attempt‟ to solve liquidity challenges, FSP representatives interviewed in this study 
claimed that as part of the agent support mechanisms, bank branches were required to provide 
dedicated counters for quick service of agents and an express queuing system for agents. 
However, the implementation of this initiative was not matched by the agents‟ experience at the 
banking halls. Agents on the other hand reported spending about thirty minutes at the banking 
halls waiting to be served. In some instances, agents were treated to cold customer experience by 
tellers who „see agents as a nuisance‟. This was intriguing as bank branches are the primary 
rebalancing points for majority of agents. 
 




4.4. Diagnostic tests 
A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was conducted to determine the distribution of data for agent 
demographic variables (gender and age) and key variables investigated to affect liquidity 
management (namely distance to the nearest bank branch, number of times agents receive 
provider visits and access to agency training). The test was published by Samuel Sanford Shapiro 
and Martin Wilk in 1965 and works by calculating a W statistic that tests whether a random 
sample comes from a population with a normal distribution (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965). Large 
values of W closer to 1.0 statistic point towards normal distribution. Also S-Wilk test rejects the 
hypothesis of normality when the p-value is less than or equal to 0.05. Table 4.5 has the findings. 
Table 4.5: Shapiro-Wilk test of Normality of Data 
Variable  Observations W Prob>Z 
Gender 159 0.695 0.06 
Age group 159 0.985      0.35 
Distance to the nearest bank branch (walking minutes) 159 0.903 0.09 
Number of times received provider visits  159 0.905 0.00 
Access to training 159 0.732 1.00 
Number of times agent denies transactions for lack of 
float 
159 0.897 0.11 
 
On the basis of the relatively high W statistics for age, distance, frequency of rebalance visits, 
access to training and transaction denials we cannot reject the null hypothesis that data for those 
variables comes from a normally distributed population.  
4.5 Bivariate analysis 
Three types of analytical approaches used to conduct bivariate analysis are Chi-square analysis 
of independence and analysis of variance (ANOVA) as prescribed in the analytical framework of 
this study. These tests were applied for agent factors namely; agent years of experience, capital 
layout of primary business, owner involvement and supply-side factors namely; distance to the 
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nearest rebalance point, transaction costs, agent training and monitoring visits. The results are 
provided and interpreted in the following sub-headings. 
 
4.5.1 Chi-square tests of agents’ years of experience vs. Liquidity challenges 
To establish the relationship between agents‟ experience in the agency and frequency of 
rebalance visits, Chi-square test of independence was conducted. Chi square is a test of 
independence between two discreet variables, which claims-in null hypothesis-there is no 
dependency between the variables of interest. The test works by comparing the calculated Chi-
square statistic with the critical statistic at the corresponding degrees of freedom. The criteria is 
to reject the null hypothesis (Ho) if the calculated statistic is greater than the critical statistic in 
which case the statistic is considered significant (p<0.05). Rejection of Ho implies lack of 
independence between the two variables of interest which in turn means presence of a 
relationship. The results of this study established a significant Pearson Chi-square statistic of 
37.055 (p=0.043>0.05) as verified in Table 4.6 which is interpreted to mean existence of a 
significant relationship between agency experience and frequency of rebalancing. Agents with 
several years of experience conduct fewer rebalance visits than their counterparts who conduct 
rebalance visits more often. 
Table 4.6: Chi-square test agency experience vs. frequency of rebalance visits 
 Value df Significance  
Pearson Chi-Square 37.055
a
 24 .043 
Likelihood Ratio 24.110 24 .455 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.841 1 .175 
N of Valid Cases 159   
 
This finding was similar to the tallied opinions of master agents and field agent managers 
reported that agents with more years of experience in the agency business had nurtured the skills 
of anticipating demand for their services and therefore plan their rebalancing tasks in advance. 
These agents also had established relationships with the liquidity facilitators who advance float 
to them to meet unanticipated demand for example, during weekends. Master agents in particular 
had systems to monitor agent‟s transactional history based on which they provide advance float. 
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4.5.2 Chi-square tests of capital layout of the main business vs. Liquidity challenges 
To establish the relationship between capital investments of the primary business and the 
frequency of rebalance visits, a Chi-square test was conducted. The results were a significant 
Pearson Chi-square statistic of 38.043 (p=0.034>0.05 24df). This means that agency outlets with 
higher investment conducted less rebalance visits than agency outlets that had fewer investments 
in their primary business. In line with this finding, financial service providers who were key 
informants to this study reported that the composition of agent layout in the agent profile has 
changed over time to include agents with lower capital investments than initially recommended. 
Instead, the providers emphasize on nature of cash-flows of the main business as a proxy for the 
agency ability to potentially turn-around cash from physical to liquid cash. FSPs therefore 
require provision of six months bank statements of the agency‟s main business as proof of 
business liquidity position, which is analyzed to determine suitability to become an agent. 
 
4.5.3 Chi-square tests of owner involvement vs. Liquidity challenges 
This study established, through Chi-square tests, that the frequency of rebalance visits depends 
on the owner involvement in the agency operations. In cases where rebalancing is done by the 
owner, the number of rebalancing visits conducted per week is higher than when non-owners are 
involved. This is verified by a Chi-square statistic of 8.506 (p=0.075<0.1 4df). In spite of this in-
depth interviews with agents established that rebalancing decisions made by the agency owners. 
This often leads to delays or postponements in rebalancing as employees await approval from the 
owners of the agency. Owner-agents cited prevalence of robbery and fraud cases propagated by 
employees of the agency or other agencies who „divert‟ with the money meant for the business 
during rebalancing visits. 
 
4.5.4 Chi-square tests of education level vs. Liquidity challenges 
Chi-square tests on the independence of education level to rebalance visits did not establish a 





4.5.6 ANOVA analysis of transaction cost vs. Liquidity challenges 
This study established that agents incur transaction costs during rebalancing and the cost was a 
significant influence on the frequency rebalancing visits conducted by agents, as verified by 
ANOVA  (F statistic of 1.818 p=0.098). This means that agents who incurred high transaction 
costs conducted less frequent rebalancing visits. Agents who had access to diverse rebalancing 
options utilized the option with the least charges on rebalance transactions. For example, M-Pesa 
agents who were able to access rebalancing services from any bank branch reported preference to 
banks which had lower or no charges on rebalancing transactions.  
 
4.5.5 ANOVA analysis of Distance to bank vs. Liquidity challenges 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to establish if there exists a relationship 
between distance from the nearest bank and the number of transactions denied due to lack of 
float. ANOVA works to compare means of a variable across a variable of interest and calculates 
an F statistic. The criteria is to reject the null hypothesis, which is that the average of a variable 
does not differ by the other variable, if the F Cal >F alpha and P<0.05. From the study an F statistic 
of 14.15, P=0.000<0.05 was established meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected, that 
transaction denial due to lack of float does not differ by distance. Therefore, the further away that 
an agent is located from a bank branch, the more the number of transactions denied due to lack 
of float. A further Pearson‟s correlation co-efficient of 0.246 (p=0.0096<0.05) was established, 
meaning that there is a positive correlation between distance and transaction denials. Thus, the 
further away the agent is located from the nearby bank branch, the more the number of 
transactions denied due to lack of float. This study, through agent qualitative interviews, reported 
that agents were located within close proximity with the banks; however, rebalance visits took 
unnecessarily long to access float due to long queues in the banking halls. 
 
4.5.7 Chi-square tests of agent training vs. Liquidity challenges 
Training on liquidity management and provider visits were other factors studied. Agents reported 
high rates (93%) of receiving initial training, however, only half of them said they have received 
training support on liquidity management. Chi-square tests on the effect of liquidity management 
33 
 
training on transaction denial due to lack of float resulted in a statistically significant Chi-square 
statistic of 18.005 (p=0.001 4df). This is interpreted to mean existence of a relationship between 
training on liquidity management and transaction denial due to lack of float. The qualitative 
findings reported that agents considered the initial training offered by the financial services 
providers as inadequate to equip them with liquidity management skills needed to utilize new 
liquidity access solutions such as mobile banking and Pesa link services. 
4.5.8 Chi-square tests of agent monitoring visits vs. Liquidity challenges 
Of the agents surveyed, 59% reported that they received regular visits from providers for an 
average of two times per month. Chi-square tests, however, did not establish lack of 
independence between provider visits and frequency of rebalance visits nor number transactions 
denied due to lack of float. This means that there is no established relationship between agent 
visits with agents‟ liquidity. Qualitative interviews with FSPs found that new mechanisms to 
monitor agents through real-time system checks had been adopted. However, this kind of 
monitoring was popular with mobile money agents than is among bank agents. Inadequate 
technological capacity and human resources to monitor agent float balances were among 
impediments cited by banks in providing liquidity support to agents. Providers reported that they 
had introduced new liquidity management mechanisms such as linking of agent accounts with 
mobile banking, offering advance float during weekends. 
 
4.7. Inferential Analysis 
Further investigation to the casual relationship between the variables was conducted, 
particularly, regression analysis for test of determination on the effect of supply-side factors on 
agent liquidity challenges. Ordered logistic regression was the regression technique adopted as it 
applies maximum likelihood estimation iterative (repetitive) procedure on ordinal outcomes, in 
the case of this study were rebalance visits and transaction denials. Ordered logistic regression is 
a discreet regression model for ordinal discreet outcome dependent variable (Wooldrige, 1999; 
Gujarati, 2004). The coefficient of determination is a pseudo R
2
 which indicates the prediction 
power while the measure of joint significance of predictors is log-likelihood chi-square (LR χ
2
 
statistic). Four supply side variable attributes namely; distance to nearest bank branch, 
rebalancing transaction cost, access to liquidity management training and provider visits were 
34 
 
used to predict the relative probability of agents having higher outcomes of rebalance visits 
(model 1) or transaction denials (model 2). Results from the two models are presented in Table 
4.7.  
Table 4.7: Ordinal Logistic Regression of YLO against Individual Attributes 
Predictor   
Rebalance Visits (Model 1) 
Estimated Coefficients 















Distance  0.0243** 0.005 -0.006** 0.0279** 0.000 0.006** 
Rebalancing 
cost 
0.1947 0.344 -0.048 0.1867 0.387 0.044 
Access to 
training 





0.1706 0.119 0.042 -0.0689 0.515 -0.016 
Pseudo R2         0.0682  0.0941   
LR chi2(4)          14.86**       0.000  




    0 .52 (52%)             0.37 (37%) 
Obs (n)       158    158   
/cut1                 1.854787 
 
          
1.247247 
  
/cut2                3.316811  
 3.114361   
/cut3              4.557742  
4.425667   
Notes:  
 
LR means Likelihood Ratio*and **indicates that parameter attained significance at 5% and 1% test levels (p< 0.05 
and p< 0.01) 
 
Assessing the power of the model, a significant LR χ
2
=14.86 (d.f. =4; ρ=0.000) is attained (The 
formula for LR χ
2
is -2*(L (null model)-L (fitted model)) for each model (Wooldridge, 1999).  Given 
the low p-value, then at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to zero 
hence all predictors (distance, rebalancing cost, access to training and visitations by service 
provider) jointly help to improve the model . The model converges at the 4
th 
iteration with a log 
likelihood of -101.4379 for Model 1 and for Model 2. -108.32641 The model for rebalance visits 
can correctly predict actual number of visits using distance, rebalancing cost, access to training 
                                                          
1
Ordered logistic regression applies maximum likelihood estimation iterative (repetitive) procedure. The analysis 
algorithm starts with a model without predictors (intercept alone) in the first iteration but adds independent variables 
in subsequent iterations. The aim is to maximize the log likelihood to a point where the difference between 
successive iterations is most minimal in which case an optimal solution will have been found. 
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and visitations by service provider as independent variables with 52% accuracy while the model 
for transaction denials can do the predictions with 37% accuracy.  
Access to rebalancing facilities emerged as a very important determinant of both rebalance visits 
and transaction denials. For every extra minute an agent has to walk to the nearest bank branch, 
the probability of rebalance visits decrease by 0.0065 ceteris paribus (holding other factors 
constant). On the other hand for every extra minute an agent has to walk to the nearest bank 
branch, the probability of transaction denials increases by 0.0066 ceteris paribus. The co-
efficient of access to rebalancing services as measured by distance to the nearest bank branch 
had a significant effect (p<0.005) on both the number or rebalance visits and transaction denials. 
The model implies that a shilling increase in rebalancing cost reduces the probability of 
rebalance visits by 0.048 and increases transaction denials by 0.044, ceteris paribus. Access to 
training increases the probability of rebalance visits and decreases the probability of transaction 
denials by 0.062 and 0.076 respectively, ceteris paribus. An additional visit by service provider 
increases the probability of rebalance visits and decreases the probability of transaction denials 
by 0.042 and 0.016 respectively, ceteris paribus. However, the co-efficient of rebalancing 
transaction cost, access to liquidity management training and frequency of provider visits did not 
attain statistical significance (p<0.05).Therefore, from the inferential analysis of the supply-side  
factors effects on liquidity challenges it was found that distance to a nearest bank branch had a 
bivariate relationship with agent liquidity management challenges (measured by rebalance visits 
and transaction denials) as well as a cause-effect relationship on the same dependent variables. 
However, whereas rebalancing cost, access to training and visitations by service provider had 
bivariate relationships with liquidity management among agents, they failed to attain a cause-




CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary of findings organized by the objectives of the study, 
conclusion, recommendations, limitations of the study and areas for further study. 
5.2 Summary of findings 
5.2.1 Relationship between agent factors and agents’ liquidity challenges 
This study established that agents‟ frequency of rebalance visits depends on agent factors 
particularly: number of years of experience, owner involvement in agency business and capital 
layout of the primary business. Liquidity management is a skill through which agents who have 
operated for more years are able to anticipate demand for cash-in and cash-out services and are 
therefore able to plan their rebalancing tasks in advance. This finding supports the information 
asymmetry argument by Jensen Meckling (1976). Furthermore, agents with more years of 
experience can also leverage on relationships built with master agent sand other liquidity 
facilitators to offer services beyond banking hours.The study also established that frequency of 
rebalance visits depend on owner involvement in the agency business so that owner-agents 
rebalance more frequently than non-owner agents. Liquidity management tasks are considered 
sensitive and are therefore not delegated to employees of the agency which could be due to fear 
of theft and fraud as explained by CGAP (2011). The CGAP (2011) study found that security 
concerns by agents influence their decisions on float investments. Capital layout of the primary 
business was established in this study to influence frequency of rebalance visits such that, agents 
or agencies with higher capital layout had less rebalance visits compared to agencies with less 
capital layout. High capital layout of the primary business implies a more sound liquidity 
position of the business of the agency which translates to ability to meet demand for cash-in and 
cash-out transactional needs. Further it was established that cash flow statements of the primary 
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business of the agency could be a better indicator of the agency‟s ability to meet demand for 
cash-in and cash-out needs. The above findings respond to the dilemma of the exact definition of 
an ideal agent profile which other studies reported in the literature review did not answer 
expressly. The CGAP (2011) study in particular noted that financial service providers (FSP) are 
in a dilemma as to what is the profile of agents that would invest adequate float, how much to 
rely on banks for liquidity services as well as quantifying the risk of float delivery to agents in 
far to reach areas. These questions had not been addressed in the past research studies. 
 
5.2.2 Effect of supply side factors on agents’ liquidity challenges 
This study established that travelling to a nearby bank branch was the primary mode of 
rebalancing as established by other studies. For example, Gichana (2013) noted the liquidity 
mechanisms used by agents reporting that retail agents rely on banks to rebalance and identified 
the need for banks to provide alternative rebalancing mechanisms to support agents in the rural 
areas preferably via automatic float top-up. Additionally, it emerged that distance to the nearest 
bank branch was an important determinants of transaction denials. The further away the distance 
to the nearest bank branch, the more the transactions denied due to lack of float. This is because 
customers. This study established that owner-agents are hesitant to delegate rebalance activities 
which tends to prolong the liquidity outage period, effectively leading to high transaction 
denials. Agents further from bank branches experience long outage periods, due to the time spent 
in travel as compared to their counterparts with closer proximity to bank branches.  
 
Similarly, it emerged that the distance to the nearest bank branch was a very important 
determinant of the rebalance visits conducted by an agent and number of transactions denied due 
to lack of float. Agents located near the bank branches visited the banks for rebalancing at a 
higher frequency than agents located further from the bank. This study found that the process of 
acquiring float at the bank was tedious and therefore any extra travel time aggravates the agents‟ 
patience with the rebalancing tasks. Agents reported in this study that they often postpone the 
rebalance visits until a time when the primary business is on the low. Agents are caught up in the 
agency dilemma where they have to weigh risking their primary business in the interest of the 
agency business. It is therefore imperative that agents prioritize their primary business or another 
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agency over the agency business -especially if the rebalancing process is more accessible. FSPs 
have provided interventions such as linking of agent accounts with mobile banking which 
significantly improves access to electronic float. However, this study found that solutions for 
access to physical cash have not been addressed in concurrence with the IFC (2015) study which 
reported that managing electronic float can be done remotely unlike the management of 
obtaining of physical cash which requires physical interventions. The study also established that 
the higher the transaction cost, the less likely the agent is to rebalance. Although there was no 
causal relationship established between transaction costs and liquidity management, it was 
reported that agents preferred to rebalance with banks which had lower or l cost or no costs. This 
finding is explained by the need to optimize returns by agents as proposed in the agency theory 
which states that agents tend to consider their business interests above the FSPs interests (Barry, 
1985). 
 
5.2.3 Agents’ perceptions towards liquidity management 
The study identified perceptions of agents that could have a bearing on their liquidity 
management practices; fear of robbery and fraud, perception of their liquidity management 
capability and towards liquidity management processes. Agents expressed great fears about the 
occurrence of theft and fraud incidences by either their employees of external parties (such as 
impersonators of FSPs staff) against their agency. Due to the fears of fraud, agents preferred 
operating with lower float levels while reducing the number of rebalance visits in a day. This is 
intended to minimize the loss incurred in the event of theft or fraud. This concurs with the 
MicroSave (2015) study in Uganda where agents cited incidents of theft and fraud from their 
employees, customers, and impersonators of providers‟ staff. The current study also established 
that agents, who are not confident with performing liquidity management tasks, often ask for 
help from their peers. Despite more than half of the agents being capable of performing 
rebalance activities on their own; a significant proportion of them (11%) needed further training 
to utilize new liquidity management interventions. Agents, as noted in this study were not much 
concerned about the cost of travelling to nearby bank branches for rebalancing than they were 
about the time consumed acquiring the float once at the banking hall. Agents reported that they 
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often postponed rebalancing activities due to the opportunity cost of the time consumed in the 
rebalancing services.  
 
5.3 Conclusions 
This thesis presented a study on the factors affecting agents‟ liquidity challenges in Nairobi 
County. It adopted a mix method cross-sectional study of agents, master agents, provider 
representatives and bank representatives. The study was guided by three objectives; 1) to 
establish the relationship between agent factors and liquidity challenges, 2) to establish the effect 
of supply side factors on agent liquidity challenges and 3) to explore agent perceptions towards 
liquidity management mechanisms. The definition of liquidity challenges was either too frequent 
or few rebalancing visits and/or high transaction denial due to lack of float, consistent with the 
MicroSave agent study (2014).  
Key findings from both qualitative and quantitative data analyses were: first, significant positive 
relationship between agents‟ experience and frequency of rebalance visits (p=0.043). This means 
that experienced agents are capable of anticipating demand for agent services and have 
established relationships with the liquidity facilitators such as master agents and banks which 
make them effective in liquidity management. Secondly, a significant relationship between 
owner involvement in liquidity management and frequency of rebalance visits (p=0.075). This is 
because owner involvement quick decision-making which allows agents to respond to emergent 
rebalances needs due to change in demand. Thirdly, a significant relationship between the capital 
investment of the main business and the frequency of agency‟s rebalance visits (P=0.034). The 
interdependence between the primary business and the agency was confirmed by prior studies 
such as CGAP (2014) which states that as part of the agency business case an existing premise 
can mop-up cash through the agency‟s withdrawal services and access cash through customer 
withdrawals. The primary business‟ cash flow position is therefore a proxy for agency capability 
to operate with minimal rebalancing visits. Fourthly, a highly significant relationship between 
distance from the nearest bank branch, agents‟ frequency of rebalance visits (p=0.0162) and 
transaction denials (p=0.000) which points to the imminent liquidity challenges facing agents 
located further away from banks for as long as banks remain the primary rebalancing mode. 
Lastly, agents were especially constrained in accessing physical cash due to lack of 
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diversification of cash access points, furthermore, agents report the need for further training in 
order to utilize new liquidity management initiatives. 6) Agents are biased to the status quo 
thereby preferring conventional ways of rebalancing such as banks. New interventions should 
address this bias to ensure that agents make use of new initiatives to tackle liquidity challenges. 
5.4 Recommendations 
This study provides recommendations at the managerial and policy level towards solving the 
agent liquidity challenges. 
5.4.1 Managerial Recommendations  
Based on the findings and implications discussed in 5.1, the following recommendations can be 
made to financial services providers: 
1) Regular revision of agents profile to suit changing liquidity needs of the agency business. 
The desired profile should include agents with several years of experience in the agency 
business, owner operated agencies and agencies with good working capital flow evidenced by 
transactional history or bank statements of the primary enterprise.  
 
2) Decentralization of liquidity hubs. While banks provide a reliable source of rebalancing 
services, it limits geographical expansion of agents to locate in areas where banks do not have 
branches. While provision of electronic float can be done remotely, acquiring physical cash 
requires FSPs to provide alternative hubs in areas where there are no banks. Further, industry 
collaborations to share such hubs among several financial services providers should be 
considered to reduce the costs involved in delivering float to agents. 
 
3) Improve agents‟ capability to minimize liquidity outages through training and financing 
agents to grow their float investment. Liquidity management is the core of the agency business 
and training agents can enhance the ability to anticipate demand, utilize new approaches and 
overcome perceptual barriers to liquidity management. Approaches such as data analytics can 
be used to determine agents that can repay financing if advanced in order to boost agencies float 
investments.  





5.4.2 Policy Recommendations  
This study has established that agents‟ liquidity challenges go beyond weaknesses in individual 
providers‟ strategic and managerial operations and is rather an industry challenge. This study 
recommends that the Central Bank regulator initiates industry level interventions to address the 
liquidity challenges ailing the agent network in general.  
5.5 Limitations of the Study 
This study involved agents in Nairobi County and the sample was therefore not representative on 
the rural context. The findings of this study should be considered in general as representative of 
the agent networks nationally (43% of agents nationally are located in Nairobi), however, 
specific niche uses cases of agent network such as rural areas, refugee camps or social payments 
corridors may exhibit unique liquidity challenges than those addressed in this study.  
5.6 Areas for Further Studies 
It has emerged in this study that agent non-exclusivity mandated by the National Payments Act 
by  the Central Bank of Kenya (2013) had an influence on agents liquidity management practices 
and access to liquidity management training. For example in this study, agents who served 
multiple providers  had diverse options for rebalancing and chose to utilize facilities of the 
provider with easier access and least fees charged on rebalancing transactions. Further studies are 
recommended to establish if and how agent non-exclusivity influences the quality of an agent 
network including training, support, liquidity management and business viability of the 
individual agencies. This would ideally shed light to the business case for a shared agent network 
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APPENDICES I: Findings from Qualitative Interviews  
The interviews findings are summarized in the Appendix Tables 1.1a, 1.1b and 1.1c.   
Appendix Table 1.1a:  Data Display from Qualitative Interviews 
Objective Financial Service 
Provider 
representatives 
Master agents & 





factors and agents‟ 
liquidity 
challenges  
 Preference of non-
exclusive agents and 
agents with 
experience. 
 There is more focus 
on agents‟ cash flows 
whereby agents 
provide 6 months 
bank statement for 
registration 
 Education level 
requirement is 
substituted by regular 
agent trainings. 
 Master-agents use the 
criteria of mandatory float 
of 50,000 for Safaricom‟s 
M-Pesa. 
 Master agents monitor 
agents‟ performance against 
transaction targets and 
adherence to recommended 
float threshold. Based on 
this they can advance float 
to top performing agents. 
 Ease of handling liquidity 
increases with the number of 
years of experience. 
 Experienced agents  establish 
relationships with master 
agents and bank staff who can 
support them with almost 
real-time rebalancing 
facilities 
 Agents who hire 
operators/employees abstain 
from delegating the liquidity 
roles. 
Appendix Table 1.1b:  Data Display from Qualitative Interviews 
Objective Financial Service Provider 
representatives 









 Banks map their agents to nearest 
branch for liquidity and 
monitoring support. 
 Bank branches who are super 
agents of MNOs. 
 Initial agent trainings include 
liquidity management 
components. 
 Subsequent agent trainings focus 
on customer service, liquidity 
management and compliance. 
  Banks offer agents dedicated 
tellers to reducing rebalancing 
time. 
 Banks lack adequate agent 
monitoring systems and HR 
resources unlike MNOs.  
 Agents divert financing meant to 
enhance their liquidity which 
dampens initiatives by providers.  
 Bank branches are 
the leading liquidity 
facilities for both 
mobile money and 
bank agents 
 Master agents 
monitor float levels 
of their agents 
through a system. 
Thus deactivating 
agents who do not 
meet the float 
threshold required. 
 Banks allow express 
counters for agents to 
access float without 
the normal queuing. 
 Bank branches are the primary 
rebalancing point and are 
accessible within walking 
distance  
 Banks closing hours does not 
match agents demand for 
liquidity 
 Agents see rebalancing 
transaction costs high. 
 Training on liquidity 
management is mostly attended 
by owners. 
 Agents need further training to 
utilize additional rebalancing 
facilities. 
 Agents use digital credit 
products such as M-Shwari, 
KCB-MPesa, Tala and Branch 
among others to obtain for 




Appendix Table 1.1c:  Data Display from Qualitative Interviews 
Objective Financial Service Provider 
representatives 











 Banks are making efforts to 
improve the agents experience 
during rebalancing points such 
as dedicated tellers for agents 
 Agents faced by fraud and 
robbery incidents tend to 
reduce their float dedication to 
the agent business 
 Agents load float to accounts 
where they know they are 
monitored and could be 
penalized. 
 Agents prefer to work 
with people who value 
and care about their 
business. This means 
putting the agents in 
the center of business. 
 Agents need partners 
not supporters. 
 Agents who are 
monitored by master 
agents are likely to 
keep more float for 
that till than for other 
tills 
 Agents fear robbery and fraud 
from employees and during 
rebalancing trips 
 Agents split the values of a 
rebalancing transaction due to 
fear of fraud and theft. 
 Agents dislike closing shops to 
travel to rebalance resulting to 
postponement of rebalancing.  
 Agents say bank tellers and they 
may prefer to rebalance at a 
further bank. 
 Non-exclusive agents visit 




APPENDICES II:  Interview Guide-Provider Representative  
 
My name is _______________, a student at Strathmore Business School. I am conducting a research on 
the drivers of liquidity management practices among agents in Nairobi and would appreciate hearing your 
views as a representative of x provider (insert provider name). I will request for 30 minutes of your time 
and assure you that information gathered will be held anonymously and confidential for use for purposes 
of this study only.  
a. Opening remarks: Agents play a critical role in the distribution of financial services in areas 
otherwise not reached by banks before. However, liquidity challenges have been termed as 
perennially hurting the business both for agents and providers. As a provider representative, what 
are your thoughts on this? 
Probe 1: What are the factors influencing agent‟s liquidity management practices  
Probe 2: How do providers equip agents to handle the task of liquidity management 
Probe 3: How does your agent selection strategy ensure that you hire agents with the capability of 
maintaining healthy liquidity balances? 
Probe 4: What are the provider constraints in the above 
Probe 5: What measures have providers taken to support agents or improve the liquidity of their 
agent network overall? 
Probe 6: Why is it important for the provider to have agents with adequate liquidity 
b. Some agents are good at managing liquidity than others. Why do you think this is so? 
Probe 1: Criteria in the selection of agents-mandatory float levels 
Probe 2: Monitoring of agents‟ float in the system 
Probe 3: Retraining of illiquid agents on liquidity management practices 
Probe 4: Actions taken against illiquid agents 
c. How suitable\constrained from your experience is the training, agent visits, liquidity mechanisms 
and agent management structure in ensuring that agents maintain adequate levels of float? 
Probe 1- How has your approach changed over the years 
Probe 2- What has influenced this change? 
d. Some providers in other markets deliver float to agents while others offer agents advance float 
facilities during weekends and public holidays? What do you think of these ideas 
Probe 1: What other interventions are you aware of in the market? 
e. What plans do you have in ensuring that agent liquidity is guaranteed for your customers? Any 
other suggestions? Thank you very much for your time. 
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Appendix 2: Quantitative Questionnaire 
 
Introduction 
My name is _________________, a student of Strathmore Business School. I am conducting a study on 
agents‟ liquidity in Nairobi area. Your participation will contribute to the enhancing of agent support by 
providers in making liquidity more accessible. Information gathered will only be used for purposes of this 
study and will be anonymised and treated with utmost confidentiality. 
Section A: Agent Demographics 
A1. Agent Name ________________      







7. South B 
8. Gikomba 









6. 58 and Above 
A5. What is the highest level of education you have attained? (Education level) 
1. Phd, Master‟s degree 
2. University degree 
3. College diploma 
4. Tertiary college certificate 
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5. Secondary school 
6. Primary school 
7. Others(specify) _________________________ 
A6. Type of primary business? (Business type) 
1. Retail store(supermarkets) 
2. Local duka 
3. Petrol station 
4. Grocery store 
5. Salon/barbershop 
6. Bureau-Cyber, printing services 
7. Drugs store-pharmacy/chemist 
8. Boutique 
9. Others(specify) _____________________ 
A7. Which service provider does this agency serve? (Provider served) 
1. Safaricom 
2. Airtel 
3. Equity bank 
4. Family bank 
5. Co-op bank 
6. KCB bank 
7. Other specify_____________________________ 
A8. Have you conducted at least one transaction, either deposit or withdrawal, in the last one month? 
(Agent Activity)?  
1. Yes 
2. No 
Section B: Agent Operations 
B1. For how long have you been managing this agency? 
1. Less than 6 months 
49 
 
2. 6 months -1 year 
3. 13 months -2 years 
4. 2-3 years 
5. 3-4 years 
6. 4-5 years 
7. 5-6 years 
8. More than 6 years 
(Agent Vintage)? _____________________ 
B3. What is your involvement in this agency (Ownership)? 
1. Owner 
2. Employee 
3. Other(specify) _____________________ 
B4. Who conducts rebalancing services (buying float) activities for this agency? 
1. Me 
2. The owner 
3. My colleague 
4. Provider staff 
5. Another agent 
6. Other specify 
B7. How much would you estimate the capital outlay of your primary business at in KES?___________ 





6. Above 1,Million 
7. Other specify ________________________________________ 
 
 
Section C: Liquidity Supply Factors 




2. Another agent 
3. Provider office/branch 
4. ATM 
5. Delivered by provider staff 
6. Other specify _____________________ 
 
C3. How far in estimated walking minutes is the nearest bank branch that can serve this agency?(Limit 5 
and 2000)________________ 
C4. How long did it take you to get float in your last rebalancing trip? 
1. Less than 30 minutes 
2. Between 30-1 hr 
3. Between 1-2 hrs 
4. Between 2-3 hrs 
5. Between 3-4 hrs 
6. Between 4-5hr 
7. More than 5 hrs __________________________ 
C5. How much did it cost you to rebalance the last time/yesterday in KES? 
1. Travel _______________________ 
2. Transaction cost ____________________ 
3. Other specify________________________ 
4. I did it together with other business errands and not just to buy float 
 
Section D: Provider Support 










D3. Does the provider or their representative visit you to offer liquidity management assistance? 
c) Yes 
d) No 
D4. If Yes,  how many times does the provider visit you in a month? ___________________ 
D5. What new liquidity management options availed to you by the provider? 
a) None 
b) Float delivery 
c) Advance float on weekends 
d) Linkage with standby liquidity rich entities 
e) Advice on float levels to maintain during peak seasons 
f) Other (Specify) ________________________ 
 
Section E: Liquidity Management Practices                
E1. How many times in a week do you visit to rebalance (rebalance frequency)?  
1. Every day 
2. Thrice a week 
3. Twice a week 
4. Once a week 
5. Twice a month 
6. Once a month 
E2. When you go to rebalance, do you require more of cash or e-float in your agency? 
1. Cash 
2. E-float 
3. Both equally 
 







6. Above 25 
Section F: Agent Perceptions towards Liquidity Management Mechanisms 
F1.As an agent which of the following statements is true about your ability to perform liquidity 
management activities*MR* ideally each of the options below should be a binary variable  
a) I can comfortably perform rebalancing activities for this agency 
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b) I always ask for assistance in performing rebalancing activities 
c) I need further training to be able to use the new liquidity facilities introduced by my provider (for 
example mobile banking) 
d) Other agents come to me for assistance to perform rebalancing services 
F2.In your opinion, how adequate is the support given by your provider in liquidity management? 
a) They call me or visit to inform me about new products and solutions 
b) They resolve any complaints in accessing liquidity quick enough 
c) They try compared to other providers 
d) They do not support me as promised whenever I have challenges 
e) They think agents are a nuisance 
F3. Which of the following issues are the 5 key challenges for this agency in managing liquidity needs? 
1. Banks are far 
2. Banks close early and or open late 
3. It is expensive to travel to a bank to rebalance 
4. Poor service by bank  staff  
5. Long queues at the banking hall 
6. I do not understand how to do liquidity rebalancing myself and I have to rely on someone 
7. I do not have enough money to invest in adequate float 
8. I am too busy with my other business and do not have time to rebalance my float 
9. If I send my staff or a provider staff to obtain the liquidity for me they might defraud or rob me 
10. I don‟t know how much float I should keep, sometimes I need more cash other times more e-float 
11. Other specify________________________________________________________________ 
 









Appendix 3: Key Informant Interview Guide-Agents 
 
My name is ______________________. I am conducting a study on the factors affecting agents‟ liquidity 
challenges in Nairobi County. Kindly spare 25 minutes of your time to discuss some of the practices and 
challenges experienced in this agency outlet while managing liquidity. You have a right to skip questions 
that you might not be willing to answer. Kindly note that information gathered will be treated with utmost 
confidentiality and will only be used for purposes of this study. 
Name________________________________ 
Opening question 
1. Agency business involves dealing with cash and electronic float. What is your experience in keeping 
adequate balances while offering deposit and withdrawal services to customers? 
Probe 1: How do you reconcile, discover that you need to rebalance? 
Probe 2: What are your fears and worries when you think of rebalancing for cash or e-float? 
2. Kindly take me through a typical day; how you prepare to ensure that you have an adequate float to 
perform all customer transactions for the day? / 
Probe 1: What are the challenges? 
Probe 2: How does demand for CICO agent services vary 
Probe 3: Concerns for holding adequate float for the day 
Probe 4: What can be done to ensure you hold enough float? 
Probe 5: How is the experience at the various liquidity access points? 
3. How has the experience in liquidity management changed over time? 
Probe 1: Does the experience vary over the years of becoming an agent? 
Probe 2: How do various providers support agents in liquidity management? 
4. What suggestions would you make to the provider on what support agents like you require in 
managing liquidity. 
Thank you for your time. 
